Military Cooperation Between Poland and the United States: An Analysis of the Scale and Significance of the American Military Presence in Poland

Streszczenie

Praca podejmuje systemową analizę współpracy wojskowej Polski i Stanów Zjednoczonych, ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem skali i znaczenia strategicznego obecności amerykańskich sił zbrojnych na terytorium Rzeczypospolitej. Sformułowany problem badawczy dotyczy pytania, czy zaangażowanie wojskowe Stanów Zjednoczonych w Polsce stanowi trwałą rekonfigurację transatlantyckich relacji bezpieczeństwa, czy też tymczasowe dostosowanie do zmiennych percepcji zagrożeń. Celem pracy jest zbadanie historycznych i prawnych podstaw dwustronnego sojuszu obronnego, opisanie struktury organizacyjnej oraz skali rozmieszczenia wojsk amerykańskich, ocena geostrategicznego wymiaru tej obecności, a także identyfikacja wyzwań i perspektyw dalszego rozwoju współpracy. W pracy zastosowano analizę dokumentów traktatowych i instytucjonalnych, analizę historyczną obejmującą okres od zimnej wojny po szczyt NATO w Wilnie, oraz studium przypadku wybranych komponentów obecności wojskowej. Przeprowadzone badania wskazują, że obecność wojsk amerykańskich w Polsce uległa jakościowej przemianie — ze stosunków rotacyjnych i w dużej mierze symbolicznych w rozbudowaną infrastrukturę stałą, obejmującą elementy dowódcze, lotnicze oraz instalację obrony przeciwrakietowej w Redzikowie. Sformułowane wnioski potwierdzają, że bilateralne relacje obronne nabrały gęstości instytucjonalnej i politycznej trwałości, stanowiąc fundament polskiej strategii bezpieczeństwa narodowego w obliczu rosyjskiej agresji zbrojnej na Ukrainę.

Słowa kluczowe: współpraca wojskowa, obecność wojsk amerykańskich w Polsce, bezpieczeństwo transatlantyckie, NATO, odstraszanie, EDCA

Abstract

The thesis presents a systematic analysis of military cooperation between Poland and the United States, with particular focus on the scale and strategic significance of the American military presence on Polish territory. The central research question concerns whether United States military engagement in Poland constitutes a durable structural reconfiguration of transatlantic security relations or a temporary accommodation to shifting threat perceptions. The study examines the historical and legal foundations of the bilateral defence alliance, maps the organisational structure and scope of US troop deployments, assesses the geostrategic dimensions of the American presence, and identifies the principal challenges and future trajectories of the partnership. The methodology combines analysis of treaty and institutional documentation, historical inquiry spanning the period from the Cold War to the Vilnius NATO Summit, and case studies of selected military components. The findings demonstrate that the American military presence in Poland has undergone a qualitative transformation — from rotational and largely symbolic arrangements to a substantial permanent infrastructure encompassing command elements, air assets, and the Aegis Ashore ballistic missile defence installation at Redzikowo. It is concluded that the bilateral defence relationship has acquired sufficient institutional density and political durability to constitute a foundational pillar of Poland's national security strategy, a conclusion rendered particularly salient by Russia's full-scale military aggression against Ukraine.

Keywords: military cooperation, US military presence in Poland, transatlantic security, NATO, deterrence, EDCA

List of Abbreviations

ABCT: Armoured Brigade Combat Team
ACO: Allied Command Operations
APS: Army Prepositioned Stocks
BMD: Ballistic Missile Defence
CEE: Central and Eastern Europe
CSDP: Common Security and Defence Policy
DPTA: Drawsko Pomorskie Training Area
EDCA: Enhanced Defence Cooperation Agreement
EDF: European Defence Fund
EDI: European Deterrence Initiative
eFP: enhanced Forward Presence
ERI: European Reassurance Initiative
GDP: gross domestic product
LANDCOM: Allied Land Command
LITPOLBAT: Lithuanian-Polish Peace Force Battalion
LITPOLUKRBRIG: Lithuanian-Polish-Ukrainian Brigade
MND NE: Multinational Division North East
NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NFIU: NATO Force Integration Unit
PAA: Phased Adaptive Approach
PESCO: Permanent Structured Cooperation
PfP: Partnership for Peace
SOFA: Status of Forces Agreement
USAREUR-AF: United States Army Europe and Africa
USEUCOM: United States European Command
VLS: Vertical Launch System
WOT: Wojska Obrony Terytorialnej

Introduction

The European security order that emerged from the Cold War's conclusion rested upon a foundational assumption: that the continent's geopolitical divisions had been irreversibly transcended, that collective defence arrangements conceived for an era of great-power confrontation would gradually yield to cooperative security frameworks premised on mutual trust, and that territorial aggression between states in Europe had become a phenomenon of the past. This assumption, never unchallenged in the nations of Central and Eastern Europe whose historical experience furnished ample grounds for scepticism, was shattered in February 2014, when Russian armed forces seized and subsequently annexed the Crimean peninsula from Ukraine. The annexation constituted a fundamental breach of the post-war international legal order and compelled a thoroughgoing reassessment of security priorities across the North Atlantic Alliance. For Poland — a state whose geopolitical position at the junction of Western institutional Europe and the post-Soviet periphery has rendered it acutely sensitive to shifts in great-power relations — the events of 2014 confirmed longstanding convictions regarding the indispensability of a credible, physically present American security guarantee on Polish soil. The subsequent years, culminating in Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, transformed what had been a matter of strategic preference into one of operational urgency, accelerating and deepening the military relationship between Poland and the United States in ways that few observers had anticipated even a decade prior.

The scale and strategic significance of the American military presence in Poland have grown continuously since Poland's accession to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation in 1999, but the pace and character of that growth have varied markedly across distinct periods. The first decade and a half of the bilateral defence relationship was characterised by gradual institutional development, the negotiation of legal frameworks governing the status of visiting forces, and Poland's progressive integration into Alliance command structures and exercise programmes. The period following 2014 initiated a qualitative transformation, as the logic of collective reassurance superseded that of partnership development, and rotational American troop deployments to Polish territory became a permanent feature of the bilateral relationship. The 2016 Warsaw NATO Summit institutionalised the enhanced Forward Presence framework, designating the United States as the lead nation for one of the four multinational battlegroups positioned on the Alliance's eastern flank, with Poland as the hosting nation. The Enhanced Defence Cooperation Agreement of 2020 provided a comprehensive legal and institutional architecture for deepened bilateral cooperation, encompassing troop presence, infrastructure development, and mutual support obligations of unprecedented scope in the history of Polish-American relations. Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 removed remaining ambiguities regarding the trajectory of the bilateral relationship and prompted further expansions of American presence, including the establishment of a permanent V Corps forward command element in Poznań and the commissioning of the Aegis Ashore ballistic missile defence installation at Redzikowo. By the mid-2020s, Poland had emerged as the principal hub of American military presence on NATO's eastern flank, hosting a force posture of a scale, institutional density, and legal formalisation that has no precedent in the post-Cold War history of the Alliance's eastern members.

It is against this backdrop of accelerating transformation that the present thesis formulates its central research problem: what is the scale of the American military presence in Poland, and what is its strategic significance for Polish security, for regional stability in Central and Eastern Europe, and for the broader architecture of North Atlantic collective defence? This deceptively simple formulation encompasses several analytically distinct but interconnected questions. The first concerns the historical and legal foundations that have shaped the bilateral relationship and established the normative framework within which military cooperation operates. The second concerns the concrete organisational, infrastructural, and financial dimensions of the American presence — the units deployed, the bases constructed, the command arrangements established, and the financial burdens allocated between the two parties. The third concerns the strategic and geopolitical logic that motivates and sustains the relationship, including the role of threat perception, strategic culture, and transatlantic burden-sharing dynamics in shaping the decisions of both governments. The fourth concerns the challenges, controversies, and future trajectories that will determine whether the current depth of cooperation can be maintained, deepened, or is subject to reversal under changed political or strategic conditions. Together, these questions constitute the analytical framework that organises the present investigation.

The significance of this research problem extends across several academic and policy dimensions. In the field of security studies, the Polish-American defence relationship offers a case study of exceptional analytical richness: it illustrates the dynamics of alliance management in a context of acute threat perception, the institutional mechanisms through which bilateral commitments are translated into operational military presence, and the interaction between domestic political variables and the durability of security partnerships. The study of this relationship illuminates broader theoretical questions concerning the conditions under which extended deterrence commitments acquire credibility, the mechanisms through which states balance the risks of strategic entrapment and abandonment, and the role of institutional architecture in generating path-dependent incentives for the continuation of security partnerships. For scholars of NATO and European security, the Polish case offers evidence relevant to ongoing debates concerning the Alliance's eastern flank posture, the sustainability of the forward presence model, and the capacity of NATO's collective defence commitments to adapt to a changed strategic environment characterised by high-intensity conventional threat. For policymakers, understanding the precise scale and significance of the American military presence in Poland is a prerequisite for informed deliberation about the future of transatlantic burden-sharing, the optimal distribution of Alliance capabilities along the eastern flank, and the conditions under which further deepening or formalisation of the bilateral relationship would serve the interests of both parties.

The research objectives of the present thesis are structured around four principal analytical tasks, corresponding to the four substantive chapters of the work. The first objective is to trace the historical evolution and map the legal and institutional architecture of Polish-American defence cooperation, from the strategic reorientation that followed the end of the Cold War through the transformative agreements of the 2020s. The second objective is to provide a systematic empirical account of the organisational structure and operational scale of the American military presence in Poland, encompassing troop deployments, military installations, command arrangements, and financial dimensions. The third objective is to evaluate the strategic and geopolitical significance of that presence, situating it within the broader framework of NATO deterrence, regional security dynamics, and transatlantic political relations. The fourth objective is to identify and analyse the principal challenges, controversies, and future trajectories that define the current and prospective character of the bilateral relationship, with particular attention to the transformative impact of Russia's invasion of Ukraine and the prospects for longer-term evolution of the partnership.

The methodological approach adopted in this thesis is qualitative and descriptive-analytical in character. Primary source analysis constitutes the foundational methodological layer: the Status of Forces Agreement governing the legal status of American forces in Poland, the Enhanced Defence Cooperation Agreement of 2020 and its subsequent implementation instruments, NATO summit communiqués from Warsaw 2016 through Madrid 2022 and beyond, Polish national security strategies and defence white papers, and official statements by governmental authorities on both sides of the bilateral relationship are subjected to systematic analysis to establish the legal and institutional framework within which the American military presence operates. This primary document analysis is complemented by a critical review of the secondary scholarly literature in security studies, international relations, and strategic studies, drawing on English-language and Polish-language academic publications as well as reports from established policy research institutions. The descriptive-analytical approach is employed to synthesise primary and secondary material into a coherent account of the bilateral relationship's multiple dimensions, avoiding the reductionism of mono-causal explanations in favour of an analysis that is attentive to the interaction of legal, institutional, organisational, financial, and geopolitical variables. Where quantitative data are available — regarding troop levels, defence expenditure as a proportion of gross domestic product, infrastructure investment, and similar measures — they are incorporated into the analysis as evidence supporting qualitative argument rather than as the basis for statistical inference.

The geographic scope of the thesis is delimited to the territory of Poland as the hosting state and to the bilateral relationship between Poland and the United States, with the multilateral NATO framework treated as the essential context within which this bilateral relationship is embedded. The temporal scope extends from Poland's accession to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation in 1999 — the constitutive moment in the legal and institutional transformation of the bilateral security relationship — through the mid-2020s, with particular analytical weight assigned to the period from 2014 onward as the era of qualitative transformation. The thematic scope encompasses American ground force deployments and their organisational structure, ballistic missile defence installations, command and coordination arrangements, the legal framework governing bilateral military cooperation, infrastructure development programmes, and the financial architecture of burden-sharing. Domains of bilateral cooperation that lie beyond the strictly military sphere — including intelligence cooperation, nuclear sharing arrangements under the NATO framework, and the industrial and procurement dimensions of the defence relationship — are acknowledged where relevant but are not treated as primary objects of analysis.

The thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 1 examines the historical and legal foundations of Polish-American defence cooperation, tracing the evolution of bilateral security relations from the Cold War era through NATO accession and the subsequent elaboration of legal instruments — including the Status of Forces Agreement and the Enhanced Defence Cooperation Agreement — that have given the relationship its current institutional character. Particular attention is devoted to the role of NATO's collective defence architecture, and especially the decisions of the 2016 Warsaw Summit and subsequent Alliance meetings, in shaping the framework within which bilateral cooperation operates. Chapter 2 provides a systematic empirical analysis of the organisational structure and scale of the American military presence in Poland, examining the character and composition of troop deployments, the principal military installations and infrastructure networks, the ballistic missile defence component at Redzikowo, command and coordination arrangements, and the financial dimensions of the host-nation relationship. Chapter 3 analyses the strategic and geopolitical dimensions of the American presence, examining the deterrence logic that motivates the relationship, the characteristics of Polish strategic culture and the national pursuit of a robust American security anchor, the implications of the bilateral relationship for regional stability in Central and Eastern Europe, and the impact of transatlantic burden-sharing debates on the political durability of American commitments. Chapter 4 addresses the challenges, controversies, and future trajectories that define the contemporary state and likely evolution of the bilateral relationship, encompassing operational and logistical difficulties, the societal and political reception of the American presence in Poland, legal and sovereignty considerations arising from the hosting of foreign forces, the transformative impact of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, and the prospects for long-term consolidation or expansion of the partnership. The Conclusion synthesises the principal findings of the thesis, evaluates the extent to which the American military presence fulfils Poland's core strategic objectives, and identifies avenues for further scholarly inquiry into the sustainability and political conditionality of American forward deployment in Central Europe.

The analysis undertaken in the pages that follow proceeds from the conviction that the Polish-American defence relationship has reached a degree of institutional depth and strategic entrenchment that renders it one of the most significant bilateral security partnerships in contemporary Europe — and one whose study is indispensable for any serious understanding of the security architecture that is being constructed, under conditions of acute geopolitical pressure, along NATO's eastern flank. The transformation of Poland from a state seeking a credible security guarantee to the principal hub of American military presence in continental Europe is a story of remarkable strategic consequence. It is the purpose of this thesis to provide that story with the rigorous, systematic analysis it merits.

Chapter 1. Historical and Legal Foundations of Polish-American Defence Cooperation

1.1. The Evolution of Polish-American Security Relations from the Cold War to NATO Accession

Poland's relationship with the United States in the domain of security and defence has been shaped by decades of geopolitical transformation, ideological confrontation, and ultimately a fundamental reorientation of Poland's strategic identity. During the Cold War era, Poland occupied a central position in the Warsaw Pact's military architecture, serving as a frontline state oriented against the North Atlantic Alliance. The presence of Soviet forces on Polish soil and Poland's subordination to Moscow's strategic priorities effectively precluded any meaningful bilateral security cooperation with the United States. This geopolitical reality defined Polish foreign and defence policy for nearly half a century, leaving a profound institutional legacy that the democratic transformations of the late 1980s would be compelled to address.

The transformative events of 1989 — encompassing the Solidarity movement's electoral triumph and the Round Table Agreements — fundamentally altered Poland's political landscape and created conditions for a thoroughgoing reassessment of its security orientation. The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact in 1991 removed the principal institutional constraint on Polish security choices and opened a period of strategic reorientation without clear precedent in modern Polish history. Political elites across the ideological spectrum rapidly converged on the view that integration with Western security structures represented the paramount national interest. This consensus was reinforced by an acute awareness of Poland's historical vulnerability to its larger neighbours and the conviction that only firm anchoring within collective Western defence could provide lasting security guarantees.

The years between 1989 and NATO accession in 1999 were characterised by a sustained diplomatic effort to demonstrate Poland's suitability for Alliance membership and to cultivate the bilateral relationship with the United States as the prospective cornerstone of Poland's security architecture. Poland's participation in the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme from 1994 onwards provided a structured framework for interoperability development and practical military cooperation with Alliance members. The PfP framework served both a technical purpose — enabling Polish armed forces to develop common procedures and doctrines with NATO counterparts — and a political one, signalling Poland's determination to pursue full membership. During this period, the United States emerged as the most consequential external actor in shaping Poland's security trajectory, with American diplomatic support for enlargement proving decisive in overcoming internal Alliance hesitations.

Debates within the Alliance over enlargement were protracted and on occasion contentious, with concerns expressed regarding the impact on relations with Russia and the practicalities of extending Article 5 guarantees across a substantially larger geographic area. Nevertheless, the strategic case for Polish membership prevailed, grounded in the recognition that a Europe free from division required the incorporation of Central European democracies into the Alliance's collective defence framework. Poland's accession to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) on 12 March 1999 represented the culmination of a decade-long process and established the formal legal foundation for the bilateral defence relationship that subsequent agreements and deployments would elaborate and significantly deepen. The moment of accession constituted not merely an administrative event but a strategic transformation with enduring consequences for both the bilateral relationship and the Alliance's overall posture.

1.2. Legal and Treaty Framework Governing the Bilateral Defence Relationship

The legal architecture governing Polish-American defence cooperation rests upon a hierarchically structured body of international agreements, supplemented by bilateral implementing arrangements that translate general treaty obligations into operational realities. At the apex of this structure stands the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949, to which Poland acceded in 1999. Article 5 of the Treaty — providing that an armed attack against one or more Allies shall be considered an attack against all, and that each member shall take such action as it deems necessary to assist the attacked party — constitutes the foundational collective defence commitment upon which the entire bilateral security relationship is premised. The political and legal significance of this provision has been subject to continuous reinterpretation in response to evolving threat assessments and strategic circumstances.

The NATO Status of Forces Agreement (NATO SOFA) of 1951 provides the primary multilateral legal framework governing the presence, rights, and obligations of forces of one member state deployed on the territory of another. The SOFA establishes comprehensive provisions regarding criminal jurisdiction over sending-state personnel, the resolution of civil claims arising from the activities of those personnel, the importation of equipment and materials, and a range of fiscal and customs matters. Poland's bilateral agreement with the United States elaborates upon the SOFA framework in a manner tailored to the specific character of American forces stationed on Polish territory. Debates have arisen within Polish legal scholarship regarding the extent to which the jurisdiction provisions of the SOFA are compatible with certain principles embedded in the Polish Constitution, particularly those relating to the equality of all persons before the law and the exclusive competence of Polish courts over offences committed on Polish territory.

The Enhanced Defence Cooperation Agreement (EDCA), concluded between Poland and the United States in 2020 and ratified by the Polish parliament, represents the most comprehensive bilateral legal instrument governing defence cooperation and the presence of American forces on Polish soil. The EDCA addresses the designation of agreed facilities and areas available for use by American forces, the command and control arrangements applicable to those forces, the procedures for the construction and improvement of infrastructure, and the allocation of costs associated with American military presence. The Agreement reflects the significantly expanded scale of American engagement in Poland that had developed in the years following the 2014 crisis in Ukraine and formalised arrangements that had previously rested on less permanent legal foundations, thereby providing a substantially more durable institutional basis for the bilateral relationship.

Table 1.1. Principal Legal Instruments Governing Polish-American Defence Cooperation
Instrument	Year	Key Provisions	Legal Character
North Atlantic Treaty (Washington Treaty)	1949	Article 5 collective defence guarantee; institutional framework of NATO	Multilateral treaty; binding under international law
NATO Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA)	1951	Jurisdiction over forces; claims procedures; customs and fiscal arrangements	Multilateral convention applicable to all NATO members
Bilateral Implementing Agreement to SOFA	2000	Elaboration of SOFA provisions for US forces in Poland; specific procedural arrangements	Bilateral executive agreement
Enhanced Defence Cooperation Agreement (EDCA)	2020	Agreed facilities and areas; infrastructure investment; cost-sharing; command arrangements	Bilateral treaty; ratified by Polish parliament

The cost-sharing dimensions of the bilateral legal framework merit particular attention, as they reflect the broader political negotiation over the distribution of burdens associated with American military presence. The question of whether Poland should bear greater financial responsibility for hosting American forces has been subject to sustained discussion, particularly in the context of American political discourse regarding Alliance burden-sharing more generally. Polish contributions to infrastructure development, operational support, and the maintenance of agreed facilities constitute a significant financial commitment, the precise scope of which is defined in implementing arrangements. The constitutional dimension of these agreements has periodically attracted judicial and parliamentary scrutiny, with aspects of the SOFA framework examined in relation to domestic legal norms governing the treatment of foreign nationals on Polish territory.

The following considerations characterise the legal framework governing the bilateral defence relationship:

The multilateral character of NATO legal instruments ensures that bilateral arrangements exist within a broader collective framework, limiting the scope for unilateral modification and providing additional stability
Provisions regarding criminal jurisdiction over American military personnel constitute a politically sensitive area, subject to periodic domestic political debate in Poland regarding sovereignty and equality before the law
Cost-sharing arrangements reflect ongoing negotiations regarding equitable burden distribution and have been shaped by broader transatlantic political dynamics regarding Allied contributions to collective defence
The EDCA provides a substantially more permanent legal foundation for American presence than the temporary arrangements that preceded it, reflecting the strategic priority assigned to the relationship by both parties in the post-2014 security environment
The legal framework explicitly preserves Polish sovereignty over the territory in which agreed facilities are located, a provision of political significance in the domestic Polish constitutional context

1.3. NATO's Collective Defence Architecture and Poland's Strategic Position

The collective defence architecture within which Polish-American defence cooperation is embedded underwent substantial transformation in the two decades following the Cold War, a transformation that profoundly affected Poland's position within the Alliance and the character of its bilateral relationship with the United States. During the 1990s, NATO's strategic posture shifted markedly from the forward-deployed deterrence model that had characterised the Cold War toward an expeditionary orientation premised on crisis management and the projection of stability beyond the Alliance's borders. This reorientation reflected a prevailing assessment that the probability of large-scale territorial aggression against Alliance members had diminished to the point where collective defence planning could be substantially de-emphasised in favour of out-of-area operations of a peace support character.

The Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation, concluded in 1997, codified political commitments regarding the Alliance's intentions vis-à-vis Russia and established the NATO-Russia Council as a mechanism for consultation and cooperation. A central element of the political understanding surrounding enlargement was the Alliance's declaration that it had no intention, plan, or reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new member states, and that it would rely on reinforcement rather than the permanent stationing of substantial combat forces. These political commitments, while not legally binding in the strict sense of international treaty law, exerted a significant constraining influence on Alliance planning for the defence of Central and Eastern European members in the years following their accession, shaping the options available to Polish defence planners and limiting the ambitions of bilateral defence cooperation.

Poland's geographic position on the Alliance's eastern flank has consistently been identified as a factor of strategic significance. The absence of substantial strategic depth — the distance between Poland's eastern frontier and its most densely populated and economically vital western regions is comparatively limited — has been adduced as a reason why the Alliance's reinforcement model requires particularly careful elaboration in Poland's case. Military analyses conducted within Alliance structures have consistently emphasised that timely reinforcement is essential to the credibility of collective defence guarantees for frontline states, given the constraints imposed by geography and the speed with which a capable adversary could generate and project military force. This geographic reality has been a persistent driver of Polish advocacy for a more robust and permanent Allied presence on Polish territory.

The 1999 Strategic Concept of the Alliance, adopted in Washington at the moment of Poland's accession, articulated a vision of security grounded in a broad and comprehensive conception that reflected the post-Cold War optimism of that period. By contrast, the 2010 Strategic Concept, adopted in Lisbon, represented a partial return to collective defence as a core Alliance mission, alongside crisis management and cooperative security. The 2022 Madrid Strategic Concept marked a further and more decisive shift, explicitly designating Russia as the most significant and direct threat to Alliance security and establishing deterrence and defence as the primary orientation of the Alliance's posture. Poland's trajectory within this evolving conceptual framework moved from a position at the periphery of Alliance strategic thinking in the 1990s toward a position of central and increasing importance in the 2020s.

The deterioration of the security environment in Europe's east — driven in particular by Russia's aggressive policy toward neighbouring states — provided the strategic rationale for the reconstitution of Polish territorial defence capabilities alongside the deepening of bilateral engagement with the United States. The rebuilding of the Territorial Defence Forces (Wojska Obrony Terytorialnej — WOT), which officially commenced operations on 1 January 2017, constituted a direct response to precisely this deteriorating environment, with the WOT's strategic objective encompassing the general military preparation and utilisation of human, material, and territorial resources for the conduct of local protection and defence across the entirety of Polish territory ^{[1, s. 71]}. This development should be understood not in isolation but as one component of a broader Polish effort to layer national and Allied capabilities.

NATO Strategic Concept 1999
Expeditionary orientation;
collective defence secondary;
enlargement as stabilisation

→

NATO Strategic Concept 2010
Collective defence restored
as core mission alongside
crisis management

→

NATO Strategic Concept 2022
Russia as primary threat;
deterrence and forward
defence as first priority

Figure 1.1. Evolution of NATO Strategic Concepts and Their Implications for Eastern Flank Defence, 1999–2022

1.4. The Role of the 2016 Warsaw Summit and Subsequent NATO Decisions

The trajectory of the Alliance's approach to the defence of its eastern members can be traced with particular clarity from the Newport Summit of September 2014, held in the immediate aftermath of Russia's annexation of Crimea and the outbreak of armed conflict in eastern Ukraine. The Newport Summit adopted the Readiness Action Plan, a package of measures designed both to reassure eastern members and to adapt Alliance posture to the fundamentally changed security environment. The Readiness Action Plan encompassed reassurance measures — the rotation of Allied forces and assets through eastern member states on a persistent basis — and adaptation measures aimed at improving the Alliance's responsiveness and readiness for Article 5 contingencies. Poland featured prominently among the beneficiaries of these reassurance activities, hosting rotational deployments of Allied land, air, and naval forces throughout the period following Newport, a pattern that significantly intensified the practical dimension of bilateral cooperation with the United States.

The Warsaw Summit of July 2016 is widely regarded as a watershed in the Alliance's approach to collective defence of its eastern members and, more specifically, in the bilateral relationship between Poland and the United States. The Summit's most consequential decision was the establishment of the enhanced Forward Presence (eFP), comprising four battalion-sized multinational battle groups deployed on a persistent rotational basis in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland respectively. Poland was designated as the framework nation for the eFP battle group deployed on its territory, with the United States serving as the lead nation providing the core of that battle group. This arrangement gave institutional expression to the central role of the United States in Poland's defence and formalised the American military commitment in a manner that was visible, persistent, and operationally meaningful, constituting the most significant evolution in Alliance posture on the eastern flank since enlargement.

Table 1.2. NATO Enhanced Forward Presence Battle Groups Established at the 2016 Warsaw Summit
Host Nation	Framework Nation	Lead Nation	Selected Contributing Allies
Estonia	Estonia	United Kingdom	France, Denmark, Iceland
Latvia	Latvia	Canada	Albania, Italy, Poland, Slovenia, Spain
Lithuania	Lithuania	Germany	Belgium, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway
Poland	Poland	United States	United Kingdom, Romania, Croatia

The Warsaw Summit also addressed the Alliance's ballistic missile defence posture, with the formal declaration that NATO's missile defence system had achieved initial operational capability. The Aegis Ashore facility at Redzikowo in Poland, designated as a component of the NATO ballistic missile defence system, constitutes a significant element of American and Allied military infrastructure on Polish territory with implications that extend well beyond conventional ground force deployments. The legal and political dimensions of this facility have been subjects of sustained discussion, particularly in relation to Russian objections characterising the system as a threat to strategic stability. The missile defence installation represents a dimension of the bilateral relationship that reflects the broader strategic significance the United States assigns to Poland as a location for defence infrastructure of transatlantic importance.

Subsequent Alliance summits elaborated and expanded upon the decisions taken at Warsaw. The Brussels Summit of 2018 and the London Summit of 2019 maintained the focus on collective defence readiness and the eastern flank while confirming the principle that persistent Allied presence would continue. The Madrid Summit of 2022 adopted decisions of historic significance in response to Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February of that year, approving a new NATO Force Model substantially increasing the number of forces available at high readiness for collective defence tasks and committing to forward defence as the Alliance's operational concept for the eastern flank. Poland's position within this evolving framework was further reinforced by decisions regarding the prospective elevation of the eFP battle group to a brigade-level presence, reflecting a materially changed assessment of the threat environment.

The rebuilding of Polish Territorial Defence Forces — initiated in direct response to the deteriorating security environment attributable to Russia's aggressive policy ^{[1, s. 71]} — was conceived as a complement to the Allied presence rather than a substitute for it. The WOT's designated role in conducting local protection and defence across the entirety of Polish territory ^{[1, s. 71]} meshed with the eFP framework's emphasis on high-readiness manoeuvre forces capable of rapid reinforcement, creating a layered approach in which national territorial defence capabilities operated alongside and in support of Allied formations. The institutional complementarity between national and Allied components of Poland's defence posture, which the Warsaw Summit decisions helped to crystallise, established the foundational logic that would govern subsequent development of both the bilateral relationship and the multilateral framework.

The following developments characterise the evolution of Alliance decisions regarding Poland's defence from Newport 2014 to Madrid 2022, tracing the institutional elaboration of the bilateral and multilateral framework:

The Newport Readiness Action Plan (2014) introduced the principle of persistent Allied presence in eastern member states through rotational deployments, establishing the practice upon which Warsaw Summit decisions would build
The Warsaw eFP decision (2016) institutionalised that presence through a structured framework designating framework nations, lead nations, and contributing Allies, with the United States as lead nation for Poland
The establishment of US Army V Corps headquarters in Poland formalised the command architecture supporting American forces on the eastern flank, providing a permanent institutional anchor for rotational deployments
The Madrid Force Model (2022) substantially increased the scale of forces committed to the defence of eastern members at high readiness, with Poland designated as a key operational hub for the Alliance's eastern posture
Decisions regarding the permanent stationing of American forces in Poland — as distinct from rotational deployment under the eFP framework — reflect the continuing evolution of both Alliance posture and bilateral political agreement in response to the changed security environment
The Aegis Ashore facility and associated missile defence infrastructure represent a strategic dimension of the bilateral relationship with implications for deterrence, arms control, and Alliance-Russia relations that extend beyond the conventional ground force framework

The period from the Warsaw Summit to the Madrid Summit thus represents a trajectory of deepening institutional commitment, expanding force levels, and broadening legal and infrastructure investment in Poland's defence. This trajectory provides the essential context for understanding the organisational structure and operational scale of American military presence that is examined in the chapter that follows.

Chapter 2. The Organisational Structure and Scale of US Military Presence in Poland

The organisational structure of United States military presence in Poland represents one of the most consequential reconfigurations of American force posture in Europe since the end of the Cold War. Building upon the legal and historical foundations examined in the preceding chapter, this chapter analyses the concrete institutional, infrastructural, and financial dimensions of that presence. The deployment architecture reflects a deliberate and layered approach, combining rotational forces, permanent command elements, advanced defensive systems, and multinational coordination mechanisms within the broader framework of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. Poland's emergence as the largest member state on NATO's eastern flank ^{[2, s. 49]} has rendered the question of American basing arrangements not merely a bilateral matter but a subject of regional and alliance-wide strategic significance.

2.1. Permanent and Rotational US Troop Deployments: Scope, Composition, and Locations

The character of United States troop deployments in Poland is defined by a fundamental distinction between rotational and permanent presence. The rotational model, institutionalised under the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) — formerly the European Reassurance Initiative (ERI) — that was launched in the aftermath of Russia's 2014 annexation of Crimea, involves the periodic relief of armoured brigade combat teams (ABCTs) drawn from the United States Army. Under this arrangement, successive ABCTs, typically comprising several thousand soldiers equipped with tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, and supporting artillery, conduct extended deployments to Polish territory before being replaced by incoming units. By the mid-2020s, up to two such brigade combat teams were stationed in Poland on a rotational basis, a figure that exceeded the comparable rotational presence maintained in Germany, and which underscored Poland's centrality within the European theatre of United States European Command (USEUCOM) ^{[2, s. 51]}.

The principal locations hosting rotational armoured forces reflect a deliberate geographical logic shaped by both infrastructure capacity and strategic positioning. The training and manoeuvre hub at Żagań and Świętoszów in Lower Silesia provides terrain and facilities suited to combined-arms operations at brigade scale. The Drawsko Pomorskie Training Area (DPTA) in West Pomerania serves as the primary venue for combined-arms live-fire training and multinational exercises, accommodating American and allied contingents simultaneously. Further east, the area of Bemowo Piskie and Orzysz in the Warmia-Masuria region functions as a forward operating location positioned with particular attention to the proximity of the Suwałki Gap — the narrow land corridor connecting Poland to Lithuania and separating the Russian Kaliningrad enclave from Belarus. The Skwierzyna area in the Lubusz region provides additional manoeuvre capacity within the rotational basing network.

A structural distinction of considerable institutional significance was formalised in 2021 with the establishment of the V Corps Forward Command Post in Poznań. Unlike the rotational ABCTs, this command element constitutes a permanent fixture of American military presence, providing enduring operational command capacity and serving as the principal interface between United States Army Europe and Africa (USAREUR-AF) and the Polish Armed Forces. The establishment of this permanent command post marked a qualitative transition, signalling that American military engagement in Poland had moved beyond a purely episodic and rotational character toward a form of durable institutional embedding. The Poznań installation, housed at Camp Kościuszko, consolidates staff functions, liaison activities, and planning responsibilities essential to the coherent management of the broader rotational force commitment.

The principal deployment categories comprising the overall American military presence in Poland may be summarised as follows:

Rotational armoured brigade combat teams under the EDI/ERI framework, cycling through Żagań, Świętoszów, and associated manoeuvre areas in western and central Poland;
Rotational aviation and logistics elements providing support to ground forces across distributed locations;
The permanent V Corps Forward Command Post at Camp Kościuszko in Poznań, established in 2021 as the enduring land command presence;
Pre-positioned equipment sets under the Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS) programme at Powidz Air Base, enabling rapid force generation without transatlantic equipment transit;
The Aegis Ashore Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) installation at Redzikowo near Słupsk, representing the most technologically advanced component of permanent American infrastructure;
Liaison and coordination staff embedded within multinational NATO headquarters structures throughout the country.

Poland's assumption of the largest NATO member state position on the alliance's eastern border ^{[2, s. 49]} has shaped both the scale and the composition of American deployments. The alliance has progressively recognised Poland not merely as a host nation for rotating forces but as a central pillar of NATO's forward posture, a recognition carrying practical implications for the density and diversity of American military elements present on Polish territory at any given moment.

2.2. Key Military Installations and Infrastructure Developments

The physical infrastructure supporting United States military presence in Poland encompasses a network of installations that have been progressively expanded and upgraded since 2014, with the pace of investment accelerating substantially following Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Each principal installation serves a distinct functional role within the overall deployment architecture, and their collective capacity determines the operational sustainability and combat readiness of the forces stationed therein.

Table 2.1. Principal US Military Installations in Poland: Functional Roles and Key Characteristics
Installation	Location / Region	Primary Function	Key Elements Hosted
Żagań / Świętoszów	Lower Silesia	Armoured manoeuvre hub; rotational ABCT basing	Rotational ABCT headquarters and subordinate armoured units
Drawsko Pomorskie Training Area (DPTA)	West Pomerania	Combined-arms live-fire training; multinational exercises	Host for Defender-Europe, Dragon, and Steadfast Defender exercise series
Powidz Air Base	Greater Poland	Strategic airlift hub; Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS-2)	Pre-positioned heavy equipment for armoured brigade; USAF airlift rotations
Camp Kościuszko, Poznań	Greater Poland	V Corps Forward Command Post (permanent element)	V Corps staff; USAREUR-AF liaison; NATO coordination functions
Bemowo Piskie / Orzysz	Warmia-Masuria	Forward operating location proximate to Suwałki Gap	Rotational US elements; multinational eFP battle group coordination
Redzikowo	Pomerania (near Słupsk)	Aegis Ashore Ballistic Missile Defence system	Permanent US Navy-operated BMD installation; SM-3 interceptors

Powidz Air Base occupies a position of particular logistical significance within the infrastructure network. Designated as the site for the Army Prepositioned Stocks-2 programme, the installation hosts a substantial reserve of heavy equipment — including armoured vehicles, artillery systems, and associated materiel — that can be rapidly issued to personnel flown in from the continental United States in a contingency requiring rapid force generation. Pre-positioning of equipment at Powidz substantially reduces deployment timelines that would otherwise be required to generate capable armoured formations in Poland, effectively decoupling personnel transit times from the considerably longer requirement of transporting heavy equipment across the Atlantic by sea.

Infrastructure investment across the principal installations has proceeded through multiple funding mechanisms. Under bilateral cost-sharing frameworks, Poland has assumed financial responsibility for a substantial share of construction and facility preparation costs, while the United States contributes through EDI-designated funding streams. Construction work at several sites has involved the development of permanent barracks, equipment storage facilities, maintenance workshops, fuel storage infrastructure, and communications systems adequate to sustain a substantial rotational force across extended periods. The scale of Polish financial commitment to base infrastructure reflects the political priority accorded by Warsaw to the consolidation of American military presence as a tangible security guarantee, functioning simultaneously as a strategic instrument and as a demonstration of allied solidarity.

2.3. The Missile Defence Component: Aegis Ashore at Redzikowo

Among the various components of American military presence in Poland, the Aegis Ashore BMD system at Redzikowo near Słupsk occupies a position of unique strategic and political significance. The installation traces its origins to the Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) announced by the Obama administration in 2009 as a reconfiguration of planned missile defence architecture in Europe. Under the PAA framework, land-based variants of the sea-based Aegis combat system were to be deployed at selected locations in Romania and Poland, providing layered defence against ballistic missile threats. The Phased Adaptive Approach represented a recalibration of earlier European missile defence concepts, replacing a more ambitious ground-based midcourse architecture with a more flexible and scalable system centred on the proven capabilities of the Aegis platform.

The Redzikowo site was formally selected and groundbreaking ceremonies were conducted in 2016, though construction delays resulted in a protracted development timeline that extended commissioning well beyond initial projections. The installation was declared operational in 2023, concluding a process of infrastructure development spanning the better part of a decade. The system incorporates the MK-41 Vertical Launch System (VLS) accommodating Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) Block IIA interceptors, alongside the AN/SPY-1 multifunction phased-array radar providing target acquisition and tracking capability. Together with the comparable installation at Deveselu in Romania, Redzikowo forms the European component of NATO's integrated BMD architecture, providing complementary defensive coverage across the alliance's southern and northern flanks.

The strategic significance of the Redzikowo installation extends beyond its technical specifications. For Poland, the presence of a permanently manned American military facility on its territory — one requiring continuous staffing by United States Navy personnel — constitutes a form of security commitment qualitatively different from the presence of rotational ground forces. Whereas rotating brigade combat teams represent deployable assets that could in principle be redeployed elsewhere, the fixed nature of the Aegis Ashore infrastructure creates a more durable form of American engagement. The installation also functions as a visible symbol of the depth of Polish-American security ties, with political salience that has been explicitly acknowledged by both governments across successive administrations.

The question of the MK-41 Vertical Launch System has generated persistent controversy in Russian strategic discourse. Russian officials have consistently argued that the MK-41, while fitted at Redzikowo with SM-3 interceptors for defensive purposes, is technically capable of accommodating offensive cruise missiles, and have advanced this claim as evidence that the European BMD architecture conceals an offensive dimension. This position has been rejected by NATO members. Within the broader context of tactical and strategic nuclear arrangements in Europe — an area of substantial analytical attention in Polish and international strategic literature ^{[4, s. 75]} — the dual-capability argument has nonetheless demonstrated persistent resonance in Russian diplomatic communications. The installation's political symbolism has thus operated on two levels: as a reassurance mechanism for Poland and its allies, and as a focal point of objection in Russian security discourse regarding the changing character of the conventional-nuclear balance on the continent.

2.4. Command Structures and Coordination Mechanisms Between Polish and US Forces

The effective integration of United States military forces with the Polish Armed Forces and the broader NATO command architecture requires elaborate institutional mechanisms for coordination, planning, and interoperability management. These mechanisms operate across multiple levels, from the strategic political-military interface to the tactical arrangements governing joint training and operational procedures. Understanding the command architecture is essential to assessing the practical depth of Polish-American military cooperation and the degree to which the two allies function as a genuinely integrated force rather than as parallel national structures operating in geographic proximity.

At the apex of the command hierarchy, United States European Command in Stuttgart exercises theatre-level responsibility for all American military activities in Europe, including those in Poland. Within USEUCOM, USAREUR-AF, headquartered in Wiesbaden, provides the land component command responsible for ground forces deployed across the European theatre. The relationship between USAREUR-AF and the Polish General Staff is mediated through the V Corps Forward Command Post in Poznań, which serves as the principal institutional node linking American operational planning with Polish military structures on a sustained basis. This arrangement ensures that the two national military authorities maintain continuous staff-to-staff contact rather than relying solely on episodic contacts during exercises or crises.

NATO command structures provide the multilateral framework within which bilateral Polish-American coordination is embedded. The NATO Allied Command Operations (ACO) oversees the full range of operational activities across the alliance, while Allied Land Command (LANDCOM), headquartered in Izmir, coordinates land component planning. Poland hosts the Multinational Division North East (MND NE) headquarters in Elbląg, a formation that reflects Poland's assumption of a lead nation role within the alliance's eastern force posture ^{[2, s. 49]}. Poland's leadership of MND NE constitutes a concrete institutional manifestation of Warsaw's aspiration to translate growing military capacity into commensurate alliance responsibilities, a trajectory that closely parallels the role assumed by the Federal Republic of Germany within NATO during the Cold War period.

The NATO Force Integration Unit (NFIU) Warsaw constitutes a further element of the institutional framework, functioning as a small staff element designed to facilitate the rapid reception and integration of reinforcing NATO forces. The NFIU coordinates planning for force reception, manages host nation support arrangements, and maintains links with both Polish national military authorities and NATO headquarters structures. The principal mechanisms for Polish-American military coordination may be summarised as follows:

Regular staff exchanges and liaison arrangements between the V Corps Forward Command Post in Poznań and the Polish General Command of the Armed Forces and Operational Command;
Joint exercise programmes including the Defender-Europe series, the Dragon exercise cycle, and the multinational Steadfast Defender exercises conducted under NATO auspices;
Interoperability working groups addressing communications standards, logistics procedures, ammunition compatibility, and rules of engagement;
Host nation support coordination through Polish military and civil authorities responsible for infrastructure access, fuel supply, and force protection measures;
Cooperative capability development within European Union defence frameworks, including the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and European Defence Fund (EDF) instruments ^{[3, s. 6]}.

Simplified Command Coordination Architecture

Strategic tier: USEUCOM (Stuttgart) → USAREUR-AF (Wiesbaden)

Operational tier: V Corps Forward Command Post (Poznań/Camp Kościuszko)

NATO parallel: ACO → LANDCOM (Izmir) → MND NE HQ (Elbląg, Poland-led) | NFIU Warsaw

Bilateral interface: V Corps FCP ↔ Polish General Command of the Armed Forces (Warsaw) ↔ Polish Operational Command

Figure 2.1. Simplified Command Coordination Architecture: US Forces and Polish Armed Forces within the NATO Framework

The relationship between NATO structures and European Union defence cooperation mechanisms has grown in practical relevance as Poland and its regional partners have pursued complementary capability development tracks. Lithuania and Poland, sharing common concerns regarding the security environment in the eastern neighbourhood, cooperate within EU defence programmes including the EDF, PESCO, and the instruments of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) ^{[3, s. 6]}. While these EU mechanisms remain institutionally distinct from NATO command structures and do not alter the fundamental character of the Polish-American bilateral relationship, they represent an additional layer of multilateral engagement reinforcing the broader pattern of security cooperation in the region. Interoperability between Polish and American forces has been the subject of sustained investment, accelerating markedly following 2014 and again from 2022 onwards, with the procurement of American-made weapons systems ^{[2, s. 51]} reducing some compatibility challenges that had historically arisen from legacy Soviet-era equipment in Polish inventories.

The financial architecture underpinning American military presence in Poland reflects a complex distribution of costs and contributions across multiple mechanisms, involving both bilateral arrangements and NATO-level funding streams. An understanding of the financial dimensions is essential both to assessing the sustainability of current arrangements and to contextualising the political debates — including those within the United States — concerning burden-sharing within the alliance. The financial relationship between Poland and the United States in the defence domain cannot be reduced to the question of base hosting costs alone; it encompasses procurement agreements, capability investments, infrastructure financing, and the overarching trajectory of Polish gross domestic product (GDP) allocation to defence.

Prior to 2014, Polish defence expenditure remained below the NATO target of two percent of GDP, a position shared by the majority of European member states. The events of 2014 catalysed a fundamental reorientation, with subsequent years witnessing a sustained and accelerating increase in Polish defence allocations. The early 2020s saw commitments to reach levels approaching four percent of GDP — figures that would, if sustained, represent among the highest defence expenditure ratios of any NATO member state. The Polish Armed Forces have followed a trajectory of accelerated militarisation since 2014, with the process gaining markedly greater speed and scale from 2021–2022 onwards, and total military strength exceeding 200,000 personnel by 2023, with plans underway to increase this number to 300,000 ^{[2, s. 49]}. This trajectory carries direct financial implications, as the costs of recruiting, training, equipping, and sustaining a force of such scale are substantial and extend across multiple budget lines beyond the headline defence allocation figure.

The procurement dimension of Polish defence investment has direct implications for the interoperability and financial relationship with the United States. The modernisation of Polish ground forces has been accomplished primarily through the procurement of advanced weaponry from the United States and South Korea ^{[2, s. 49]}, with the American component including main battle tanks, self-propelled artillery systems, air defence systems, and associated training and logistics packages. These procurement agreements generate substantial financial flows between the two governments and create long-term maintenance, training, and support relationships that reinforce the structural depth of the partnership beyond the immediate question of troop deployments.

The cost-sharing arrangements governing the physical infrastructure of American presence are structured primarily through the bilateral frameworks examined in Chapter 1. Poland has assumed financial responsibility for a substantial share of facility construction and preparation costs at the principal hosting installations, while the United States contributes through EDI-designated funding streams that support exercises, pre-positioned equipment, and the sustainment of rotational force commitments. This arrangement reflects Warsaw's political determination to demonstrate tangible investment in the maintenance of American military presence and to pre-empt arguments that Poland derives security benefits without incurring commensurate obligations — a concern rendered particularly acute by the burden-sharing pressure applied by the Trump administration across the alliance.

The principal financial features characterising the current arrangement include the following elements:

Poland's defence spending trajectory from below two percent of GDP pre-2014 to commitments approaching four percent by the early 2020s, representing one of the most sustained increases among NATO member states;
Polish financial contributions to facility construction and infrastructure across major hosting locations, structured under bilateral cost-sharing frameworks;
American EDI funding streams supporting exercises, pre-positioned stocks, and rotational force sustainment in Poland across successive annual budget cycles;
Substantial procurement agreements for American defence systems generating long-term bilateral financial flows and support relationships;
Infrastructure costs associated with the Aegis Ashore facility at Redzikowo, where construction overruns contributed to delays in the commissioning timeline;
Ongoing operational and maintenance costs of the Army Prepositioned Stocks programme at Powidz and associated logistics infrastructure.

The overall burden distribution in the Polish-American military relationship reflects a pattern in which Poland assumes a disproportionate share of hosting and infrastructure costs relative to some other NATO member states, while the United States contributes the combat capability, advanced systems, and command infrastructure that Poland's own defence industry cannot currently provide at equivalent scale. This functional division of responsibilities has proven politically durable across multiple governments in both capitals, underpinned by the convergence of interests identified in Chapter 1 and reinforced by the deteriorating security environment that has prevailed since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The financial architecture of the partnership thus reflects not merely an accounting exercise in burden allocation but an expression of the strategic calculus that renders deep mutual investment the rational choice for both parties given the prevailing threat environment.

Chapter 3. Strategic and Geopolitical Dimensions of the US Presence in Poland

3.1. The Russian Factor: Deterrence Logic and Threat Perception

The transformation of Poland's security environment in the second decade of the twenty-first century cannot be understood in isolation from the trajectory of Russian foreign and security policy. The annexation of Crimea in 2014 constituted a fundamental rupture in the post-Cold War European order, compelling Central and Eastern European (CEE) states to recalibrate their threat perceptions and, consequently, to reassess the adequacy of existing alliance commitments. Prior to 2014, the prevailing assumption across much of Western Europe had been that territorial defence was an obsolescent concept, rendered unnecessary by the cooperative security frameworks that had developed in the decades following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The Kremlin's intervention in Ukraine shattered this assumption and imposed a renewed salience upon the question of military deterrence.

The logic driving the Russian approach to the post-Soviet space is illuminated by the broader pattern of Moscow's strategic behaviour. Russia disapproved of any changes to the status quo of the post-Soviet space, and sought to counter the European Union's advance and influence in the region.^{[2, s. 49]} The absence of a comprehensive post-Cold War security treaty establishing clear boundaries of permissible influence contributed to what observers characterised as a „cold peace” or „strategic impasse” between Russia and Western institutions.^{[2, s. 49]} Within this ambiguous framework, Moscow repeatedly tested the limits of Western resolve. The relative passivity of the European Union in response to Russia's 2008 intervention in Georgia appears, in retrospect, to have informed the Kremlin's subsequent calculations. Russia believed it had a much stronger military position compared to the coloured revolutions a decade earlier, and Moscow realised after the EU's reluctance to mount a strong resistance in Georgia that the Union would not go out of its way to stop further interventions in the post-Soviet space.^{[2, s. 49]}

These dynamics directly shaped the demands emanating from Central and Eastern Europe following the events of 2014. The CEE member states called for NATO to expand its military presence on their territory and to adopt a stronger posture towards Russia's aggressions in Ukraine.^{[2, s. 51]} From Warsaw's perspective, these demands were not merely reactive but reflected a deeply embedded strategic logic: only a credible and tangible allied presence on Polish soil could furnish the deterrent effect that abstract security guarantees could not. The United States responded to these calls by intensifying its engagement with the region. American leaders visited CEE capitals on a weekly or monthly basis, reassuring their counterparts of the continued commitment of the United States to collective defence under the umbrella of NATO.^{[2, s. 51]} The United States further increased its naval presence in the Black Sea, and NATO troops were deployed for exercises in Poland and the Baltic states.^{[2, s. 49]}

The Russian response to these developments was to frame NATO's enhanced presence as a violation of the 1997 NATO–Russia Founding Act, which had stipulated the absence of permanent or excessive allied military forces on the territory of Eastern European states.^{[2, s. 51]} This legal argument served a dual function: it provided rhetorical legitimacy to Russian objections while simultaneously introducing a degree of ambiguity into the Alliance's force posture decisions. Poland and the Baltic states rejected this framing, contending that the changed security environment rendered the original assumptions of the Founding Act obsolete. From the perspective of deterrence theory, the deployment of US forces to Poland embodied a form of forward defence — a commitment device designed to raise the costs of any potential Russian aggression to a level that renders it strategically irrational. The deterrent credibility of such a presence derives not merely from its military mass but from the political signal it transmits: an attack on Polish territory would constitute an attack on American personnel, thereby triggering the full weight of US military power.

The significance of US military capabilities in this calculus cannot be overstated. The United States is a true military power in NATO which, in the foreseeable future, may be capable of effectively supporting the security of the eastern flank of the Alliance in the event of an invasion from the east, and can therefore effectively deter such an invasion.^{[5, s. 416]} This assessment, which informed Polish strategic prioritisation throughout the Duda presidency, is undergirded by a substantial asymmetry between American and Russian military power: US military expenditures exceed those of Russia by nearly seven-fold.^{[5, s. 416]} The qualitative and quantitative gulf between American and Russian military capabilities represents the foundational premise upon which Poland's security strategy rests — a premise that renders the maintenance of US engagement in Europe an existential priority from Warsaw's perspective.

Table 3.1. Key inflection points in Russian policy and NATO's eastern flank response, 2008–2022
Year	Russian action	NATO / Allied response	Effect on Poland's strategic posture
2008	Military intervention in Georgia	Limited EU/NATO reaction; no substantial consequences for Russia	Reinforced Polish conviction that soft responses invite further aggression
2014	Annexation of Crimea; destabilisation of eastern Ukraine	Reassurance measures; Wales Summit pledges; rotational US deployments	Acceleration of calls for permanent NATO presence; expansion of Polish defence budgets
2016	Continued hybrid operations in Ukraine; military build-up	Warsaw Summit; eFP battlegroups established in Poland and Baltic states	Poland hosts multinational eFP battlegroup; rotational US armoured presence confirmed
2020	Intensified pressure on Ukrainian border	EDCA signed; increased US troop levels in Poland formalised	Legal and institutional consolidation of the US-Polish defence architecture
2022	Full-scale invasion of Ukraine	Rapid Allied reinforcement; persistent command elements; V Corps HQ reactivated in Poland	Poland repositioned as primary hub for Allied operations across the eastern flank

3.2. Poland's Strategic Culture and the Pursuit of a Permanent US Presence

Poland's orientation towards the United States as its primary security guarantor reflects not merely a pragmatic calculation derived from present geopolitical circumstances but a disposition deeply embedded in the country's strategic culture. The historical experience of the Polish state — marked by repeated foreign domination, partition, and occupation — has produced a distinctive security consciousness in which proximity to a powerful external guarantor is perceived as an indispensable condition of sovereignty. The experience of Russian and Soviet dominance over preceding centuries informs contemporary Polish security thinking in ways that systematically elevate the value of American commitments over multilateral European frameworks, the latter being viewed as insufficiently robust in the face of determined great-power pressure.

This orientation has been articulated with particular clarity in successive Polish strategic documents and in the foreign policy conduct of successive governments, regardless of partisan affiliation. Poland's fundamental orientation of foreign and defence policy remains unchanged regardless of which government is in power, and there is broad consensus among experts that this fundamental orientation in its Euro-Atlantic direction persists across the political spectrum.^{[2, s. 51]} The resilience of this bipartisan consensus — observed even through the significant ideological differences between the Law and Justice governments of 2015–2023 and their predecessors — testifies to the depth at which the concept of the „American anchor” is embedded in Polish strategic culture. Security commitments to the United States are treated not as the preference of a particular political faction but as a structural feature of Polish grand strategy.

The concept of the „American anchor” captures the essential logic of Polish security policy: the bilateral relationship with Washington functions as the irreplaceable foundation upon which all other security arrangements are constructed. Membership in NATO and the European Union, as well as wide cooperation with neighbours and strategic partners, above all the United States, have become one of the basic guarantors of Polish security and international stance.^{[7, s. 10]} The security architecture of the Republic of Poland is explicitly based on Atlantic and European „pillars,” strengthened by strategic bonds with the United States, and defence policy is constructed in connection with the rules of solidarity and allied loyalty, with full recognition that Poland's territory, bordering both NATO and the EU, is of significant geostrategic importance.^{[7, s. 9]} Within this framework, the Atlantic pillar is understood to be qualitatively superior to its European counterpart in terms of its capacity for credible hard security guarantees.

The presidency of Andrzej Duda (2015–2025) represented a period of particularly intensive pursuit of deepened US engagement. The greatest effort in international affairs was directed from the outset of Duda's presidency towards developing the strongest possible alliance relationship with the United States, including within NATO.^{[5, s. 416]} This prioritisation was manifested across a range of domains: high-level diplomatic exchanges, the formalisation of defence cooperation through the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, the modernisation of Polish armed forces with American technologies, and robust energy collaboration including liquefied natural gas imports and nuclear power initiatives.^{[5, s. 412]} The formal agreements concluded during this period, particularly the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement signed in 2020 and declarations of strategic partnership, were highlighted as pivotal steps in solidifying Poland's status as a key regional platform for US military operations.^{[5, s. 412]}

Poland's strategic aspirations extend beyond the bilateral relationship to encompass a broader repositioning within the European order. Against the backdrop of heightened confrontation between the Euro-Atlantic community and Russia, Poland's strategic orientation has echoed that of West Germany during the Cold War.^{[2, s. 49]} Poland has asserted its role as the largest NATO member state on the alliance's eastern border and expects to join the group of „Western powers,”^{[2, s. 49]} a formulation that signals an ambition not merely to contribute to European security but to exercise a shaping influence upon it. The bilateral relationship with the United States is understood in this context as a precondition for such elevated status: it is through the depth and visibility of the US-Polish partnership that Poland acquires the strategic weight necessary to be taken seriously as a regional power.

Multilateral formats were pursued alongside the bilateral relationship as complementary instruments rather than substitutes. The initiatives pursued in parallel included the following frameworks:

The Three Seas Initiative, linking twelve Central and Eastern European states along the Baltic–Adriatic–Black Sea axis in pursuit of infrastructure and energy connectivity;
The Visegrád Group, providing a platform for coordinated engagement between Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary;
The Lublin Triangle, comprising Poland, Ukraine, and Lithuania as a mechanism for regional security coordination;
The Polish-Romanian-Turkish trilogue, extending the network of partnerships beyond the immediate neighbourhood;
Cooperation within the Weimar Triangle and bilateral relations with numerous European and non-European allies.^{[5, s. 416]}

These multilateral engagements served to amplify Warsaw's voice within alliance structures and to demonstrate Poland's capacity as an organising power within the broader region. They were consistently framed in Polish strategic discourse as complements to, rather than substitutes for, the central relationship with Washington — a hierarchy that reflects the underlying conviction that effective multilateralism requires a foundation of credible bilateral great-power commitment.

3.3. Geopolitical Implications for the Eastern Flank and Regional Stability

The consolidation of an extensive US military presence in Poland carries implications that extend well beyond the bilateral relationship to shape the security environment of the entire eastern flank of the North Atlantic Alliance. To appreciate the full scope of these implications, it is instructive to situate them within the broader trajectory of European defence since the end of the Cold War — a trajectory characterised by a prolonged period of contraction followed by a reversal driven by Russia's renewed military assertiveness. Russia, as the post-Cold War successor to the Soviet Union, has had a more significant effect than the European integration project on national security and defence policies in Europe, and the evolution of the European security environment over the last three decades appears to have had an almost diametrically opposed effect on national armed forces to that on European defence integration.^{[6, s. 5]}

The post-Cold War transformation of European armed forces approximated a three-stage process. The first phase lasted until the turn of the century: European powers cashed in the peace dividend, reduced their military personnel and equipment, and shifted from territorial defence to humanitarian and peace support operations. The absence of a major conventional threat from Russia benefited European defence integration in the late 1990s and early 2000s, while simultaneously leading to declining national defence budgets and a shift away from territorial defence.^{[6, s. 5]} NATO functioned throughout this period as both a key enabler and a shaper of national defence policies and military transformation in Europe.^{[6, s. 5]} The third phase, initiated by the Kremlin's subsequent increased military assertiveness, reversed this trajectory, compelling European capitals to rediscover the importance of territorial defence.^{[6, s. 5]} Poland's sustained investment in its own armed forces and in the deepening of US engagement represents the most comprehensive expression of this continental recalibration.

Stage	Approximate period	Dominant posture	Principal driver
I — Peace dividend	1990–2001	Demobilisation; budget reductions; force drawdowns	Absence of major conventional threat from Russia following Warsaw Pact dissolution
II — Expeditionary	2001–2014	Out-of-area humanitarian and stabilisation operations; continued personnel reductions	Post-9/11 interventionism; Balkans and Afghan theatres; perceived obsolescence of territorial defence
III — Territorial revival	2014–present	Renewed territorial defence investment; eastern flank reinforcement; defence budget increases	Russia's annexation of Crimea; 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine

Figure 3.1. Three-stage evolution of European defence posture, 1990–present (conceptual schema based on Meijer and Wyss, 2018^{[6, s. 5]})

For the Baltic states — Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania — the enhanced US presence in Poland carries a significance that is simultaneously material and symbolic. The material dimension relates to the logistics and command architecture that a substantial US presence in Poland enables: Poland functions as the primary strategic depth and reinforcement corridor for the Baltic region, and any allied operation in the Baltic littoral would necessarily rely upon the infrastructure, basing, and command nodes concentrated on Polish territory. The symbolic dimension is equally significant: the visible commitment of the United States to Poland's defence transmits a deterrence signal to the Kremlin that extends to the entirety of the eastern flank. The reassurance function of this presence — its capacity to sustain allied cohesion by demonstrating that Washington's commitments are credible — is therefore a collective good that the Baltic states and other flank members consume alongside Poland itself.

Poland's emergence as a key host of the large US military contingent and its positioning as NATO's third-largest military by personnel in 2024^{[2, s. 51]} have fundamentally altered the strategic geography of the Alliance's eastern flank. Poland has significantly expanded its armed forces and has asserted its role as the largest NATO member state on the alliance's eastern border,^{[2, s. 49]} thereby acquiring the capacity to serve as an anchor state for the broader regional security architecture. This capacity is reflected in the range of alliance functions that Polish territory now hosts: rotational and persistent US ground forces, allied battlegroups under the enhanced forward presence framework, air defence installations, logistical nodes, and command structures oriented towards the eastern threat axis.

The implications for Ukraine, while distinct given that country's non-membership of NATO, are also substantial. The concentration of allied capabilities in Poland — encompassing intelligence-sharing arrangements, logistics support, and military assistance flows — enabled a sustained pattern of Western support to Ukrainian defence efforts following the 2022 invasion. Poland's function as a transit and coordination hub for allied assistance to Ukraine reflects the geopolitical consequence of the prior decades of investment in US-Polish military infrastructure. The overt anti-Russian discourse of the CEE member states, while perpetuating tensions within broader European and transatlantic frameworks,^{[2, s. 49]} simultaneously produced a degree of strategic clarity within NATO that had been absent during the preceding decades of ambiguity about the Alliance's eastern commitments.

The broader regional implications of Poland's strategic repositioning may be summarised across several dimensions:

Poland as the primary reinforcement corridor for allied operations in the Baltic region, providing strategic depth that the Baltic states themselves cannot furnish given their limited territorial extent;
The deterrence signal transmitted to the Kremlin by US force presence in Poland, benefiting all eastern flank members including Romania, Bulgaria, Slovakia, and the Baltic states through the credibility of Alliance commitments;
Poland as a logistics and coordination hub for allied military assistance channelled to Ukraine following the February 2022 invasion, leveraging infrastructure developed during preceding years of deepening US-Polish defence cooperation;
The contribution of Polish military expansion to the overall credibility of NATO's conventional deterrence posture on the eastern flank, as Poland's third-place ranking by Alliance personnel in 2024 demonstrates;^{[2, s. 51]}
The Three Seas Initiative as a framework for deepening regional infrastructure connectivity in ways that enhance allied mobility and logistical resilience across Central and Eastern Europe.^{[5, s. 416]}

The active participation of the Polish Armed Forces in NATO structures allows Poland to have influence on the direction of changes, not only to protect but also to strengthen the potential of both organisations.^{[7, s. 9]} This formulation encapsulates Poland's ambition to transition from the role of security consumer — a state that relies upon allied guarantees for its protection — to the role of security provider, one that shapes the institutional and operational frameworks within which collective defence is organised. The scale and depth of US military engagement in Poland is thus not merely an instrument of deterrence in the narrow sense but a platform for Poland's broader aspirations to exercise agency within the Euro-Atlantic security order.

The question of burden-sharing within the North Atlantic Alliance has been a persistent feature of transatlantic relations, but it acquired renewed urgency in the context of political pressures that explicitly questioned the value that the United States derives from its European commitments. For Poland, these debates have carried a particular strategic weight, since the entire architecture of Polish security — the product of sustained diplomatic investment across the Duda presidency and its predecessors — rests upon the continued willingness of the United States to maintain its engagement on the eastern flank. The domestic politics of the United States thus constitute an external variable of the first importance for Polish security planning, one that Warsaw can influence at the margins through its own behaviour but cannot determine.

Poland's response to burden-sharing pressures has been to pursue a strategy of demonstrable contribution — a deliberate effort to ensure that no American political actor could reasonably characterise Poland as a free rider upon US security provision. Poland rapidly expanded its armed forces, becoming NATO's third-largest military by personnel in 2024,^{[2, s. 51]} and the trajectory of Polish defence expenditure reflected a sustained effort to signal commitment at a level that would be politically salient in Washington. This approach reflects an understanding that in an era of contested transatlantic solidarity, the maintenance of US engagement requires not merely legal commitments but a continuous demonstration of political will and material contribution. Poland's strategy of framing high defence spending as political investment in the bilateral relationship rests upon an accurate reading of American political culture: a partner that manifestly carries its own weight is substantially more difficult to abandon than one that depends upon allied provision.

The main challenges and interests of the Republic of Poland in the area of security include: securing the independence and sanctity of the country's territory, the EU borders, and the Euro-Atlantic area; assuring safety for citizens; guaranteeing stable functioning of the country including economic and energy development; and assuring a strong stance on the international scene, enhancing the importance of Poland as a reliable partner and member state of both the EU and NATO.^{[7, s. 9]} The pursuit of reliable-partner status is not merely a matter of principled commitment to alliance obligations; it is a calculated investment in the relationship with Washington, designed to generate the political capital necessary to sustain American engagement during periods when domestic US opinion becomes sceptical of the returns on European security commitments.

The longevity of the strategic partnership constructed during the Duda presidency will hinge on sustained effort across Poland's political spectrum.^{[5, s. 413]} This assessment identifies a structural vulnerability in the Polish strategic position: the depth of the US-Polish relationship has been constructed in no small measure through the personal and institutional channels cultivated by a specific presidential administration, and the translation of these achievements into durable institutional commitments requires active maintenance by successive Polish governments regardless of their partisan orientation. The bipartisan consensus on Euro-Atlantic orientation that has characterised Polish foreign policy provides a foundation for this continuity, since Poland's fundamental orientation of foreign and defence policy remains unchanged regardless of which government is in power.^{[2, s. 51]}

Table 3.2. Key instruments of Poland's strategy to sustain US engagement
Instrument	Function in bilateral relationship	Relevant source
High defence expenditure trajectory	Signals allied reliability; pre-empts burden-sharing criticism from Washington	^{[2, s. 51]}
Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (2020)	Institutionalises US military presence; raises costs of disengagement on both sides	^{[5, s. 412]}
Declarations of strategic partnership	Elevates the relationship to a politically visible tier; generates bipartisan US stakeholders	^{[5, s. 412]}
Bipartisan domestic consensus on Euro-Atlantic orientation	Guarantees policy continuity across Polish electoral cycles; reduces perception of political risk for US	^{[2, s. 51]}
Multilateral leadership (Three Seas Initiative, Visegrád Group)	Demonstrates Poland's role as regional organiser; amplifies the strategic value of the bilateral relationship for Washington	^{[5, s. 416]}
Energy partnership (liquefied natural gas imports, nuclear cooperation)	Extends the bilateral relationship beyond the military domain; creates additional US economic stakeholders	^{[5, s. 412]}

The Duda administration laid a robust foundation for advancing Polish-American strategic cooperation, and the significance of the formal agreements concluded during this period lies precisely in their capacity to generate institutional inertia — a form of structural commitment on both sides that makes reversal costly regardless of changes in the political complexion of either government.^{[5, s. 413]} The increasing effectiveness of the realisation of Polish priorities in NATO and the EU, as well as concern about the proficiency, consistency, and effectiveness of allied mechanisms, are identified as vital elements of Polish security policy.^{[7, s. 10]} This formulation captures the dual nature of Poland's strategic task: it is insufficient merely to deepen the bilateral relationship with the United States; Warsaw must simultaneously work to ensure that the multilateral frameworks within which that relationship is embedded — above all NATO — remain credible and effective instruments of collective defence.

The prospects for the sustained US-Polish strategic partnership depend upon the interaction of several variables whose trajectories cannot be predicted with confidence. The evolution of American domestic politics will shape the degree to which Washington prioritises its European commitments. The trajectory of Russian foreign and military policy will determine the salience of the threat environment that provides the primary justification for forward US deployment. And the capacity of Poland's own political system to maintain the bipartisan consensus on Euro-Atlantic orientation will condition the consistency with which Warsaw pursues the sustained effort that the partnership's longevity requires.^{[5, s. 413]} What can be stated with confidence is that the strategic architecture constructed during the Duda presidency — encompassing formal agreements, persistent force presence, modernisation programmes, and energy partnerships — has materially raised the costs of any American disengagement from Poland, creating institutional and political investments on both sides of the Atlantic that exercise a gravitational pull towards the continuation of the relationship. The strong and stable position of Poland in international structures, especially the European and Euro-Atlantic ones, remains the prerequisite for national security,^{[7, s. 9]} and it is upon this premise that the entire edifice of Polish-American strategic cooperation ultimately rests.

Chapter 4. Challenges, Controversies, and Prospects for Polish-American Defence Cooperation

4.1. Operational and Logistical Challenges of Hosting US Forces

The deployment of United States military personnel and equipment to Polish territory on a sustained, rotational basis has generated a series of operational and logistical challenges that, while progressively being addressed, continue to demand institutional attention and bilateral coordination. Among the most immediate difficulties encountered in the early phases of enhanced presence were shortcomings in basic infrastructure: the absence of permanent housing facilities necessitated the use of containerized housing units, while dining facilities required rapid construction or adaptation to accommodate the needs of rotating American contingents. The operationalisation of these facilities, confirmed at the EDCA Joint Commission convened on February 26, 2026, represented a concrete milestone in resolving the most acute deficiencies, with Polish authorities taking an active role in providing dining support to U.S. personnel.^[9] The successful completion of these arrangements demonstrated that the institutional mechanisms established under the EDCA are capable of translating political commitments into practical operational improvements.

Supply chain and fuel logistics have constituted a further dimension of the operational challenge. The strategic depth of Poland's eastern regions, which house several critical military installations, imposes considerable demands on logistics networks that must be capable of sustaining high-tempo operations under contested conditions. The recent completion of a bulk fuel storage facility at Powidz addressed one of the most significant vulnerabilities in the existing infrastructure, enhancing both readiness and interoperability between Polish and American forces.^[9] The Powidz facility is particularly noteworthy given its role in the Army Prepositioned Stocks programme, where reliable fuel supply is a prerequisite for the rapid operationalisation of heavy equipment drawn from pre-positioned stocks in the event of a contingency. These infrastructure investments, while technically unglamorous, represent the logistical foundation upon which the credibility of the entire deterrence architecture ultimately depends.

Interoperability between the armed forces of Poland and the United States presents ongoing technical and doctrinal challenges that resist rapid resolution. While joint exercises conducted under the auspices of NATO and bilateral frameworks have progressively harmonised operational procedures, differences in communication architectures, logistics management systems, and command cultures persist at multiple organisational levels. These gaps are being narrowed through regular training rotations and the institutionalisation of joint planning processes, yet they cannot be fully eliminated in the absence of deeply integrated command structures extending below the corps level. The resolution of interoperability challenges is thus best understood as an incremental, long-term process rather than a discrete problem amenable to a single institutional fix.

The legal framework governing the presence of U.S. forces — principally the Status of Forces Agreement and its supplementary arrangements — has required ongoing implementation and clarification. The ratification of the Labor Implementing Arrangement by President Karol Nawrocki marked a significant advance, providing a durable legal basis for the employment of Polish nationals in support of U.S. military activities.^[9] This arrangement serves a dual function: it offers essential, sustainable logistical support to American forces, while simultaneously generating employment opportunities for the local Polish workforce — a dimension of practical significance for communities in the immediate vicinity of U.S. military installations. The significance of this instrument was explicitly acknowledged by senior U.S. officials at the Joint Commission, who characterised it as a genuine mutual benefit rather than a unilateral American prerogative.^[9]

Table 4.1. Selected EDCA Infrastructure Milestones Confirmed at the Joint Commission, February 2026
Infrastructure Element	Location / Scope	Status as of February 2026
Containerized housing units	Multiple sites	Operationalised
Dining facilities for U.S. personnel	Multiple sites (Polish-operated)	Operationalised
Bulk fuel storage facility	Powidz	Completed
Labor Implementing Arrangement	Nationwide framework	Ratified by President Nawrocki
Critical infrastructure locations (multiple)	Various eastern sites	Operational

4.2. Societal and Political Reception of the US Military Presence in Poland

The reception of the United States military presence in Poland by the domestic political establishment has been characterised by a degree of consensus that is notable by comparative standards. Across successive governments — including those led by the Law and Justice party and the subsequently formed coalition under Prime Minister Donald Tusk — the fundamental orientation of Poland's foreign and defence policy has remained unchanged.^{[2, s. 49]} This bipartisan commitment to Euro-Atlantic integration and to the deepening of the defence relationship with Washington reflects not merely an elite-level agreement but also a broader understanding, widely shared across the Polish political spectrum, that collective security within NATO represents the indispensable guarantee of national independence. The durability of this consensus across multiple governmental transitions constitutes one of the principal structural assets of the bilateral relationship from the American perspective.

Parliamentary debates on defence cooperation have tended to focus on the adequacy of commitments rather than on the desirability of the partnership itself. The dominant tenor of legislative scrutiny has concerned the pace of infrastructure development, the terms of cost-sharing arrangements, and the degree to which Poland's specific security requirements — particularly those arising from its eastern border — have been internalised in Allied planning. Such debates are best understood as expressions of an ambitious ally seeking deeper integration rather than as manifestations of scepticism toward the bilateral relationship. The political logic that drives these demands is consistent with a long-standing Polish strategic preference: to convert the country's geographical exposure into institutionalised Allied commitment rather than allowing it to remain an uncompensated strategic liability.

At the level of civil society, the presence of American forces has been broadly accepted, particularly in communities adjacent to military installations where economic benefits are directly experienced. The Labor Implementing Arrangement — which facilitates the employment of Polish nationals in support of U.S. military activities — provides a tangible link between the defence partnership and local economic welfare, reinforcing public support in regions that might otherwise perceive the American presence primarily in terms of the disruptions associated with large-scale troop movements and construction activity.^[9] The local employment dimension of the partnership is understood by both governments to serve an important legitimising function, embedding the bilateral relationship in the economic interests of affected communities in a manner that creates constituencies for its continuation.

Marginal political opposition to the U.S. military presence has existed but has not achieved significant electoral or institutional salience. Criticisms advanced from both the nationalist right and the post-communist left have tended to focus on questions of sovereignty and on the risk of entanglement in American strategic commitments perceived as potentially destabilising. These arguments have not, however, succeeded in dislodging the fundamental pro-American and pro-NATO consensus that has characterised Polish security policy since the accession to the Alliance in 1999. The consistency of political support for the partnership across ideologically divergent governments confirms the assessment that defence cooperation with the United States has acquired the status of a national interest rather than a partisan preference.^{[2, s. 49]}

Bipartisan support for Euro-Atlantic integration maintained across successive governments regardless of political orientation
Parliamentary scrutiny focused on the pace and depth of commitments rather than on the relationship itself
Local economic benefits from employment arrangements reinforcing civil society acceptance near military installations
Marginal opposition from nationalist and post-communist quarters remaining electorally insignificant
Public confidence in NATO membership as the primary guarantee of national security underpinning stable political consensus

4.3. Legal and Sovereignty Considerations: Extraterritoriality and Host-Nation Prerogatives

The legal architecture governing the presence of United States forces in Poland seeks to reconcile the operational requirements of a foreign military contingent with the sovereign prerogatives of the host state. The NATO Status of Forces Agreement, supplemented by the Enhanced Defence Cooperation Agreement and its implementing arrangements, establishes the jurisdictional framework within which questions of criminal liability, civil claims, and regulatory compliance are resolved. This framework necessarily involves concessions on the part of the host state regarding the exercise of jurisdiction over foreign military personnel — concessions that have generated periodic constitutional and political debate in Poland concerning the adequacy of protections for Polish citizens and the integrity of national legal order. These debates reflect a broader tension inherent in all host-nation arrangements between the formal preservation of sovereignty and the practical realities of a large-scale foreign military presence.

Environmental responsibilities on military installations have emerged as a specific area of legal and policy concern. The use of land for military purposes — including the construction of permanent and semi-permanent facilities, the operation of heavy equipment, and the storage of fuel and other potentially hazardous materials — generates obligations under both Polish environmental law and the terms of bilateral agreements. The negotiation of responsibility for remediation in the event of environmental damage constitutes an ongoing dimension of host-nation management that requires sustained legal attention and, in some instances, politically sensitive discussions about the allocation of financial liability between the host nation and the sending state.

The most theoretically compelling dimension of the legal and sovereignty debate concerns the strategic implications of hosting elements of the American missile defence architecture. The alliance security dilemma framework provides an analytically rigorous lens through which the position of Poland as the host of the AEGIS Ashore facility at Redzikowo may be examined.^{[8, s. 54]} The core insight of this framework is that states hosting American missile defence systems face a fundamental tension: while such systems enhance deterrence and security guarantees, they simultaneously increase the host state's strategic visibility and its exposure to the threat perceptions and potential retaliatory considerations of the target state — in this case, the Russian Federation.^{[8, s. 51]} This dual dynamic of enhanced protection combined with increased strategic exposure characterises the dilemma confronted by Polish policymakers in accepting the Redzikowo installation.

The tension between the risks of entrapment and abandonment — which Snyder identified as the defining poles of the alliance security dilemma — is directly applicable to Poland's position within the American missile defence architecture.^{[8, s. 54]} Entrapment risk is understood as the danger of being drawn into a conflict arising from an ally's strategic commitments or deployments; abandonment risk refers to the possibility that the ally will disengage at a moment of crisis, leaving the host state exposed to the very adversary whose threat perceptions the deployment has heightened. Poland's decision to accept the AEGIS Ashore installation represents a deliberate resolution of this dilemma in favour of enhanced deterrence — a judgement that the benefits of a credible American security guarantee outweigh the costs of increased strategic exposure and the potential for Russian targeting prioritisation.^{[8, s. 53]}

Polish sovereignty is formally preserved within the EDCA framework. The agreement stipulates that U.S. forces operate on Polish territory with the full knowledge and consent of the Polish government, that Polish law applies in principle to all activities on Polish territory, and that the host nation retains ultimate authority over the use of its land and infrastructure. The operational realities of a large-scale military presence inevitably introduce frictions between formal sovereignty and practical autonomy, yet the institutional mechanisms established under the EDCA — including the Joint Commission — provide forums within which Polish concerns may be systematically raised and addressed on a regularised basis.^[9] These mechanisms ensure that sovereignty constraints are managed through dialogue rather than unilateral assertion, preserving the cooperative character of the relationship while allowing for the resolution of disputes arising from the inevitable ambiguities of host-nation arrangements.

4.4. The Impact of the War in Ukraine on the US-Polish Defence Relationship

The commencement of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, constituted a watershed moment in the development of the United States-Poland defence relationship, accelerating trends that had been incrementally developing since 2014 and fundamentally altering the strategic context within which the bilateral partnership is embedded.^{[2, s. 51]} The invasion removed residual ambiguities about the character of the Russian security threat and generated strong incentives for both the United States and Poland to deepen the institutional and material dimensions of their cooperation with a degree of urgency that had previously been difficult to sustain. The political conditions for accelerated investment in the bilateral defence relationship were thus created by an external shock whose magnitude and character validated the strategic premises on which the partnership had long been constructed.

The immediate operational response involved the substantial reinforcement of U.S. forces deployed to Poland. The rotational presence, which had previously comprised a single Armoured Brigade Combat Team, was augmented with additional combat-capable units, and the activation of the V Corps headquarters in Poznań provided a higher-level command structure capable of coordinating the employment of U.S. land forces across the Eastern Flank. These decisions were understood not merely as responses to the immediate crisis but as investments in a more enduring forward defence posture consistent with the transformed threat environment. The institutionalisation of V Corps as a forward-deployed headquarters represented, in particular, a qualitative enhancement of the command architecture that could not easily be reversed without significant reputational and strategic costs.

Lithuania and Poland emerged from the post-invasion period with a sharpened understanding of their shared strategic position as prospective frontline states in any NATO-Russia contingency.^{[3, s. 6]} In a conflict between NATO and Russia, both countries face the inevitability of becoming frontline states and a buffer for Western Europe, bearing equal responsibilities to protect the eastern EU and NATO borders and to maximise their chances of receiving Allied support if they cannot withstand an attack independently.^{[3, s. 6]} The geographical proximity of Belarus and the Kaliningrad enclave to both Polish and Lithuanian territory makes this bilateral dimension of territorial defence particularly critical. Military cooperation between Warsaw and Vilnius, initiated in 1994 and institutionalised through the Lithuanian-Polish Peace Force Battalion (LITPOLBAT), which became operational in 1999, and subsequently through the Lithuanian-Polish-Ukrainian Brigade (LITPOLUKRBRIG), provided an existing framework through which the intensified post-2022 defence requirements could be channelled.^{[3, s. 6]}

NATO's strategic adaptation following the invasion reshaped the framework within which U.S.-Polish cooperation operates. The decisions adopted at the Madrid Summit in June 2022 represented a fundamental revision of the Alliance's approach to territorial defence, replacing a posture oriented primarily toward deterrence by punishment with one emphasising enhanced forward defence. New Force Model commitments established higher readiness requirements across the Alliance, and Poland's role as the host of Multinational Division North East reflected its centrality to the revised Allied force structure. These institutional changes created additional demand for the deepening of the U.S. military footprint in Poland and provided a multilateral legitimation for bilateral investments that might otherwise have been contested as disproportionate or provocative.

The continuing practical progress of the EDCA framework — evidenced by the Joint Commission meeting of February 26, 2026 — demonstrates that the impetus generated by the invasion has translated into durable institutional momentum rather than a temporary surge of political attention.^[9] The commission reviewed progress across the full spectrum of defence cooperation and reaffirmed the shared commitment to enhancing U.S. readiness and the security of NATO's Eastern Flank, confirming that the bilateral relationship has entered a phase of sustained institutionalisation. The regularisation of the Joint Commission process as a mechanism for reviewing and deepening practical cooperation represents, in itself, an important indicator of the maturation of the partnership.

Period	Triggering Event	Principal Effect on US-Polish Cooperation
2014	Russian annexation of Crimea	Initiation of European Reassurance Initiative; rotational ABCT deployment commences
2016	NATO Warsaw Summit	Enhanced Forward Presence formalised; AEGIS Ashore construction begins
2020	EDCA signed	Bilateral framework for 5,500+ U.S. forces; V Corps basing agreed
February 2022	Full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine	Force reinforcement; V Corps activated in Poznań; Madrid Force Model decisions
2024–2026	Sustained EDCA implementation	Infrastructure milestones achieved; Labor IA ratified; Joint Commission regularised

Figure 4.1. Key Milestones in the Intensification of US-Polish Defence Cooperation, 2014–2026

4.5. Future Trajectories: Permanent Basing, Emerging Technologies, and Long-Term Commitments

The long-term evolution of the United States-Poland defence relationship is shaped by three intersecting sets of variables: the institutional and political trajectory of the bilateral partnership itself, the character and intensity of threats emanating from the eastern security environment, and the capacity of Poland's armed forces to absorb and sustain the commitments that the partnership entails. Each of these variables carries significant uncertainty, yet the institutional investments already made on both sides raise the costs of disengagement substantially and establish a structural bias toward continuity and deepening rather than retrenchment. The bilateral relationship has reached a degree of institutional density — expressed through overlapping agreements, joint headquarters, pre-positioned equipment, and regularised consultation processes — that renders disengagement a politically and operationally costly option for either party.

The question of whether the U.S. military presence in Poland will eventually transition from a rotational to a formally permanent basis remains one of the most consequential open questions in the bilateral relationship. Rotational presence has been the established formula precisely because it allows both parties to maintain the substance of a permanent deployment without incurring the political complications associated with a formally designated permanent base. Poland has consistently expressed a preference for the greater legal certainty and strategic signal that a formal permanent basing arrangement would provide, and Polish officials have argued that such a step would represent the ultimate guarantee of American commitment to the defence of national territory. The resolution of this question is likely to depend substantially on developments within U.S. domestic politics and on the broader trajectory of the American strategic commitment to the European theatre.

Poland's position as NATO's third-largest military by personnel in 2024 — with a declared ambition to expand its armed forces to 300,000 — underscores the degree to which the country has internalised the logic of robust self-defence as a complement to alliance-based security guarantees.^{[2, s. 49]} This quantitative expansion is accompanied by a qualitative modernisation programme that encompasses the acquisition of advanced air defence systems, main battle tanks, self-propelled artillery, and multirole combat aircraft. The integration of these platforms with American systems — and the interoperability requirements this integration generates — creates structural demand for the continuation of close bilateral defence cooperation far into the future. A Polish military of 300,000 personnel, equipped with modern Western platforms, cannot be effectively employed without the joint exercise frameworks, logistics support, and command integration that the bilateral relationship provides.

The emergence of cyber and space as operational domains of strategic significance introduces new dimensions into the future evolution of the partnership. Poland has been developing national cyber defence capabilities and has expressed interest in deeper cooperation with the United States on cyber threat intelligence sharing, joint exercise frameworks, and the protection of critical national infrastructure from state-sponsored attacks. These emerging domains present opportunities for deepening the bilateral relationship in ways that are less geographically constrained than conventional force deployment, while simultaneously introducing novel legal and regulatory questions concerning the limits of information sharing and the boundaries of operational cooperation. The institutionalisation of cooperation in these domains is likely to proceed incrementally, drawing on the template established in the conventional military sphere.

Formal permanent basing vs. continued rotational presence remains a key unresolved question, with Poland consistently favouring the former
Expansion to 300,000 military personnel creates sustained structural demand for interoperability investment and bilateral training frameworks
Integration of cyber and space domain capabilities represents the primary frontier for future deepening of cooperation
U.S. domestic political dynamics — including debates on burden-sharing and overseas commitments — constitute the principal source of structural uncertainty for the partnership
Institutional sunk costs embedded in the EDCA, V Corps, and infrastructure networks establish strong path-dependent incentives for continuity

The sustainability of the partnership over the long term ultimately depends on the persistence of a shared perception of threat and shared strategic interest — conditions that the evidence of the mid-2020s suggests are well-established but not immutable. The institutional architecture already created — including the EDCA, the regularised Joint Commission process, the V Corps headquarters, and the network of infrastructure being progressively developed — represents an accumulated investment that gives both parties strong incentives to continue deepening rather than allowing the relationship to atrophy.^[9] The alliance security dilemma — the tension between the risks of entrapment and abandonment that has been a constant feature of Poland's strategic calculus — is likely to remain a structuring consideration in bilateral relations for the foreseeable future, as Poland continues to calibrate its investment in the American security guarantee against the costs of the strategic exposure that guarantee entails.^{[8, s. 51]} The balance of available evidence suggests that Polish policymakers have concluded, with broad political support, that the benefits of deep integration with American defence capacity outweigh those costs — a conclusion whose durability will be tested by the strategic environment of the coming decades.

Conclusion

The present thesis has undertaken a systematic analysis of the military cooperation between Poland and the United States, examining its historical and legal foundations, its organisational scale and institutional architecture, its strategic and geopolitical rationale, and the challenges and future trajectories that define its evolving character. Across four substantive chapters, it has been argued that the American military presence in Poland constitutes not a temporary accommodation to cyclical threat perception but a structural reconfiguration of transatlantic security relations — one that has progressively acquired the institutional density, financial depth, and political consensus necessary to sustain itself across changes of government in both capitals and across shifts in the broader geopolitical environment. The evidence assembled in support of this argument permits the formulation of several principal conclusions, which are set out below before reflections are offered on the broader significance of the partnership and the avenues for further scholarly inquiry that the study has identified.

The first principal conclusion concerns the historical and legal foundations that lend the Polish-American defence relationship its legitimacy and durability. As demonstrated in Chapter 1, the trajectory of bilateral security ties from Poland's Cold War subordination within the Warsaw Pact to its accession to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation in 1999 represents one of the most consequential strategic transformations in modern European history. The decision to pursue NATO membership was not merely a foreign policy preference of a particular government but an expression of a durable elite and societal consensus, grounded in a historically conditioned awareness of Poland's geopolitical vulnerability, that Western collective defence was the only reliable guarantor of national security. This consensus provided the political foundation upon which the subsequent deepening of bilateral arrangements was constructed. The legal architecture governing the relationship — encompassing the Status of Forces Agreement, the Enhanced Defence Cooperation Agreement of 2020, and the network of bilateral commitments elaborated through successive NATO summits — was shown to represent a sophisticated juridical framework capable of managing the inherent tensions between alliance obligations, sovereign prerogatives, and the practical demands of hosting a large foreign military contingent. The Warsaw Summit of 2016 emerged, in this analysis, as a critical institutional moment, translating political commitments into structured force presence arrangements whose elaboration through the Madrid decisions of 2022 substantially deepened the Alliance's eastern deterrence posture. The legal and institutional framework that resulted is sufficiently robust to exercise a path-dependent pull towards continuity, raising the political and practical costs of any significant reversal.

The second principal conclusion pertains to the organisational scale and institutional architecture of American military presence in Poland, as analysed in Chapter 2. It has been demonstrated that the deployment configuration in Poland is distinguished by a layered character, combining rotational armoured brigade combat teams operating under the European Deterrence Initiative with the more permanent command infrastructure represented by the V Corps Forward Command Element established in Poznań. This layered architecture reflects a deliberate strategic choice: the maintenance of rotational forces satisfies formal commitments under the NATO-Russia Founding Act while providing the operational mass required for credible deterrence, while the permanent command element provides the institutional anchor that ensures continuity of planning, coordination, and readiness regardless of the pace of rotational reliefs. The key military installations examined — Powidz Air Base, Camp Kosciuszko, the Drawsko Pomorskie Training Area, and the Aegis Ashore facility at Redzikowo — represent not merely points of force concentration but nodes in a broader infrastructure network whose development constitutes a substantial sunk cost for both parties. The missile defence component at Redzikowo was shown to add a strategic dimension to the bilateral relationship that extends beyond conventional deterrence, providing a capability relevant to the defence of allied territory across a wide geographical arc. The financial architecture of the partnership, characterised by Poland's commitment of defence expenditure approaching four percent of gross domestic product and by substantial American investment under the European Deterrence Initiative, reflects a burden distribution that, while not symmetrical in kind, has proven politically sustainable and strategically functional. The scale of this organisational presence — measured in personnel, installations, financial flows, and institutional linkages — constitutes the material expression of the strategic relationship whose rationale is examined in the chapter that follows.

The third principal conclusion addresses the strategic and geopolitical rationale that sustains the partnership. Chapter 3 demonstrated that the bilateral relationship is underpinned by a robust convergence of interests, though one whose character and intensity are not identical on both sides. For Poland, the American military presence serves as the primary expression of what Polish strategic culture has termed the „American anchor” — a commitment of sufficient credibility and permanence to deter Russian military action and to provide reassurance in a security environment characterised by acute threat perception. Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014 and its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 were identified as the pivotal events that transformed threat perception from an elite preoccupation to a broadly shared societal conviction, dramatically strengthening the domestic political foundations of the host-nation relationship. For the United States, Poland's emergence as the most capable and most forthcoming ally on NATO's eastern flank — committed to sustained defence investment, consistently supportive of Alliance solidarity, and possessed of significant and growing military capacity — has made the relationship strategically valuable not only in the bilateral sense but as a model of the burden-sharing relationship that Washington has consistently sought to promote across the Alliance. The analysis of transatlantic burden-sharing debates confirmed that Poland's posture has earned it a privileged position in American strategic calculations, providing a degree of protection against the fluctuations in US commitment that have periodically alarmed European partners. The geopolitical implications for regional security were also assessed: the American presence in Poland was shown to exercise a stabilising effect on Baltic state security, to contribute to NATO's deterrence credibility more broadly, and to represent an important element in the broader effort to sustain the rules-based European security order in the face of sustained revisionist pressure.

The fourth principal conclusion concerns the challenges, controversies, and future trajectories examined in Chapter 4. The analysis demonstrated that the partnership, notwithstanding its institutional consolidation, continues to generate tensions that require ongoing management. Operationally, the demands of hosting a substantial and continuously rotating foreign military presence have exposed infrastructure shortcomings that have required sustained remedial investment. The gap between the political aspiration for permanent basing and the legal and diplomatic constraints that have thus far preserved the rotational character of most American forces remains among the most significant unresolved questions in the bilateral relationship. Societally, the partnership commands broad public support in Poland, grounded in the threat perceptions noted above, but this support coexists with latent concerns about sovereignty, legal extraterritoriality, and the asymmetries of dependence that are inherent in a relationship between a superpower and a medium-sized state. The war in Ukraine was shown to have accelerated the deepening of the relationship in ways that have further raised both its strategic value and its political visibility, reinforcing the consensus in favour of the partnership while simultaneously raising the stakes of any future deterioration. Looking forward, the question of formally permanent US basing in Poland, the integration of cyber and space domain cooperation, and the management of US domestic political variability were identified as the principal determinants of the partnership's long-term trajectory.

The significance of the Polish-American defence relationship for NATO's eastern flank extends beyond the bilateral balance sheet. Poland's emergence as the principal hub of American military presence in Central and Eastern Europe has transformed the strategic geography of the Alliance's eastern posture, concentrating command infrastructure, prepositioned equipment, and training facilities in a location that provides both deterrent visibility and operational utility. The V Corps Forward Command Element in Poznań provides a permanent institutional framework for the coordination of allied land forces across the eastern flank, while the network of infrastructure established through bilateral investment supports reinforcement timelines that would be materially degraded in its absence. The credibility of Article 5 commitments, which depends ultimately on the perceived willingness and capability of the United States to defend allied territory, is substantively enhanced by the physical presence of American forces and headquarters on Polish soil — a presence that creates a tripwire function analogous to, though considerably more substantial than, the Cold War-era deployments in the Federal Republic of Germany. Poland's consistent willingness to invest in its own defence capacity and to assume the financial and logistical burdens of host-nation support has, moreover, demonstrated that eastern Alliance members are capable of contributing substantively to collective defence rather than remaining passive beneficiaries of American security provision. This demonstration effect has important implications for the political sustainability of US commitment, reducing the burden-sharing grievances that have periodically strained transatlantic relations.

The alliance security dilemma — the persistent tension between the risks of abandonment and the risks of entrapment that has structured Polish strategic calculation throughout the period under examination — has not been resolved by the institutional consolidation of the partnership. It has, rather, been managed through the construction of an institutional framework sufficiently dense to make abandonment costly while sufficiently differentiated to preserve a degree of Polish operational autonomy. The Enhanced Defence Cooperation Agreement, the V Corps headquarters, the Aegis Ashore facility, and the network of bilateral procurement relationships all function as commitment mechanisms that raise the political and practical costs of American disengagement, while Poland's own growing military capacity reduces, at the margin, the degree of dependence on American provision. Yet the tension between permanence and rotationality, sovereignty and dependency, and bilateral partnership and multilateral Alliance obligations remains structurally embedded in the relationship and is unlikely to be fully resolved as long as the formal status of US forces in Poland continues to be governed by arrangements that preserve the legal fiction of temporariness. The resolution of this tension — whether through a formal permanent basing agreement, through the progressive institutionalisation of arrangements that are permanent in substance if not in legal form, or through some novel formula yet to be elaborated — represents one of the most consequential policy questions facing both governments in the coming decade.

Several avenues for further scholarly inquiry are identified by the present study. The domestic political determinants of American forward deployment in Central Europe merit systematic analysis, particularly as they relate to the mechanisms through which institutional and financial sunk costs constrain the freedom of action of future administrations whose strategic priorities may differ from those that created the current presence. The comparative study of host-nation arrangements across NATO's eastern flank — examining the extent to which Poland's experience offers a replicable model for other member states, and the conditions under which such replication is feasible — represents a further productive research agenda. The legal dimensions of the partnership, including the precise implications of SOFA implementation for host-nation sovereignty and the evolving jurisprudence governing the status of foreign forces, merit more granular legal-theoretical treatment than the present study has been able to provide. The social and political reception of the American military presence in Poland, examined here at a relatively aggregated level, would reward more disaggregated sociological analysis sensitive to regional variation, generational difference, and the role of elite communication in shaping mass attitudes. Finally, the integration of cyber and space domain cooperation into the bilateral relationship, which is currently at an early stage of institutionalisation, will require sustained scholarly attention as it develops, given its implications for the legal and operational frameworks within which the partnership operates.

In summation, the military cooperation between Poland and the United States has undergone a transformation of such depth and breadth since 1999 — and particularly since 2014 — that it can no longer be adequately characterised as a bilateral security arrangement of conventional type. It has become, rather, a structural element of NATO's eastern deterrence architecture, embedded in a legal framework of considerable sophistication, sustained by a financial commitment of substantial scale, and underpinned by a convergence of strategic interests that has thus far proved resilient to the pressures of domestic political change in both capitals and to the volatility of the broader transatlantic environment. The American military presence in Poland represents, in this analysis, a qualitative shift in the transatlantic security relationship — a shift that reflects the irreversible transformation of the European security order since 2014 and that is likely to define the parameters of Central European security for a generation to come. Whether the institutional architecture already established will prove adequate to the demands of that future — including the demands imposed by the continued war in Ukraine, by the trajectory of Russian strategic ambition, and by the evolution of American strategic priorities — remains an open question. What the present study has demonstrated is that the foundations upon which that architecture rests are more substantial, and more deliberately constructed, than the language of rotationality and temporariness with which it is formally described would suggest.

List of Tables

Table 1.1. Principal Legal Instruments Governing Polish-American Defence Cooperation
Table 1.2. NATO Enhanced Forward Presence Battle Groups Established at the 2016 Warsaw Summit
Table 2.1. Principal US Military Installations in Poland: Functional Roles and Key Characteristics
Table 3.1. Key inflection points in Russian policy and NATO's eastern flank response, 2008–2022
Table 3.2. Key instruments of Poland's strategy to sustain US engagement
Table 4.1. Selected EDCA Infrastructure Milestones Confirmed at the Joint Commission, February 2026

List of Figures

Figure 1.1. Evolution of NATO Strategic Concepts and Their Implications for Eastern Flank Defence, 1999–2022
Figure 2.1. Simplified Command Coordination Architecture: US Forces and Polish Armed Forces within the NATO Framework
Figure 4.1. Key Milestones in the Intensification of US-Polish Defence Cooperation, 2014–2026